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“SOME PORTION OF MISCOUNDUCT”: THE 
ARGUMENT FOR A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR 
EXCEPTING DISCHARGE OF DEBTS INCURRED 
THROUGH DEFALCATION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The United States Circuit Courts are currently split on the correct 
standard for defalcation: that is, they are split on what level of mental 
culpability a fiduciary must possess before bankruptcy courts exclude 
debts incurred through misconduct from discharge. The First, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Circuits apply a recklessness standard. The Fourth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits apply a negligence standard. The time has come to 
resolve the circuit split because the inter-jurisdictional nature of business 
in the twenty-first century creates a danger that fiduciaries will not have 
notice of potential liability if standards for liability vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction. Based on original intent and current policy interests, the 
correct resolution of the circuit split is for all of the circuits to apply a 
negligence standard.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you have entrusted your personal funds to an agent with 
the instructions that the agent is to hold the funds in an account for you 
and disburse them to manage your affairs when asked to do so. The agent 
assures you that he will handle your money with competence and care. 
You go about your business, confident that your money lies in good hands. 
Several years later, you discover that your agent has declared bankruptcy. 
In addition, he did not keep your funds in a separate account, but rather he 
commingled them with funds in his personal account. For that reason, the 
agent owes you money from his personal funds. He claims he had 
commingled funds throughout his years of working as a trustee and had 
never experienced problems before. Thus, he had no reason to think that 
he was failing to comply with his duties by handling your funds in the way 
he did. Nevertheless, you want him to repay his debt to you, 
notwithstanding his bankruptcy declaration. The issue is whether the 
agent, even though failing to act as an upstanding fiduciary, can discharge 
his debt to you because he did not know that his behavior was 
inappropriate.   
A current circuit split in the nation’s bankruptcy law jurisprudence 
demonstrates prevalent tensions in the United States’ legal system, 
namely, the tension between states’ rights and legal uniformity, as well as 
the tension between accountability and leniency towards the honest 
debtor.1 Though these countervailing interests are pervasive throughout 
the legal system of the United States, as it relates to this circuit split, they 
arise in a very narrow context. The question is this: When a fiduciary 
declares bankruptcy and attempts to discharge his debts in order to obtain 
a fresh start, to what extent must he misbehave before a court can choose 
to exclude some of those debts from discharge?  
When an individual debtor declares bankruptcy, section 523(a)(4) of 
the Bankruptcy Code provides both relief to the bankrupt debtor and 
several exceptions to the discharge of debts.2 One of these exceptions 
                                                 
1 See Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 170 F.3d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the 
interests of states’-rights advocates to tailor exemptions from discharge to local 
conditions runs counter to the federal interest in uniformity); Andrea Johnson, Note, The 
Defalcation Exception to Discharge: Should a Fiduciary’s Mistake Prohibit a Discharge 
from Debt?, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 95 (2005) (stating that the confusion between 
the circuits is increased by the goals of the Bankruptcy Code, which seeks to give a fresh 
start to “honest” debtors while attempting to repay “similarly situated” creditors). 
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006) (“(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt … for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or 
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applies to debtors who commit defalcation3 while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity.4 The financial crises of recent years have drawn attention to a 
circuit split regarding the state of mind required to exempt a debt from 
discharge due to defalcation.5 Scholarship on the issue recognizes two 
major competing policy concerns: bankruptcy’s interest in providing the 
honest but unfortunate debtor with a fresh start and the desire to hold 
fiduciaries accountable to their victims.6 
This Note will argue that the latter interest, of holding fiduciaries 
accountable to their victims, must ultimately outweigh the former; it will 
also examine the circuit split from an originalist7 perspective. Those 
considerations will lead to the conclusion that courts should uniformly 
apply a negligence standard to defalcation cases. First, as a matter of 
providing background information, this Note will describe the recent case 
that brought renewed attention to defalcation, Denton v. Hyman (In re 
Hyman).8 Having established the import of the circuit split, the Note will 
then turn to an examination of original intent under Central Hanover Bank 
and Trust Co. v. Herbst.9 Next it will proceed into an examination of the 
various perspectives proffered by the circuit courts;10 the First, Second, 
                                                                                                                         
larceny”); see also 11 U.S.C § 727(a)(7) (2006) (“The court shall grant the debtor a 
discharge, unless … the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), 
(5), or (6) of this subsection.”). 
3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009) (defining defalcation as 
“embezzlement” or “[l]oosely, the failure to meet an obligation; a nonfraudulent default” 
and the archaic definition given is “[a] deduction; a setoff”). 
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006). 
5 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 93 (stating that courts have disagreed over the 
necessary level of intent required to find defalcation); Matthew W. Knox, Note, 
Persistent Confusion: The Circuit Split Over the Exception to Discharge for Defalcation 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), 34 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1078, 1080-81 (2008) (finding the 
circuits employ three varying standards for the mental state required for defalcation). 
6 Knox, supra note 5, at 1079-80 (arguing that §523(a)(4) is designed to balance the 
interests of the victim of defalcation with the goal of allowing an honest debtor to emerge 
from bankruptcy with a fresh start). 
7 See Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(finding that the original meaning of defalcation was not limited solely to cases of 
“deliberate malversations”). 
8 502 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2007). 
9 See Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511 (finding that the original intent of 
defalcation was not limited to cases of intentional malfeasance, but included other 
defaults as well). 
10 See Patel v. Shamrock Floorcovering Serv. (In re Patel), 565 F.3d 963, 970-71 (6th 
Cir. 2009); In re Hyman, 502 F.3d at 68-69; Oklahoma Grocers Ass’n, Inc. v. Millikan 
(In re Millikan), 188 Fed. App’x. 699, 701-02 (10th Cir. 2006); Rutanen v. Baylis (In re 
Baylis), 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re 
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Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits require a heightened mental state of 
willful neglect or recklessness.11 This Note will explain that these four 
circuits support a standard that will ultimately prove contradictory and 
unworkable. It will then point to the negligence standard utilized by the 
Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as the standard that would 
properly resolve the circuit split.12 Finally, this Note will address the 
argument that circuit courts should apply a willful neglect or recklessness 
standard in order to promulgate norms established under the business 
judgment rule13 and conclude that norms of corporate law, as 
demonstrated through the business judgment rule, in fact support a 
negligence standard. Ultimately, this Note will show that a negligence 
standard is the most workable standard because it is consistent with 
original intent, is practical to apply, and is the most appropriate standard in 
light of the current economic climate, which has demonstrated the import 
of accountability.  
 
I. DEFALCATION: PERVASIVE CONFUSION 
 
On January 12, 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
G. Hallett Denton’s petition for writ of certiorari.14 Denton petitioned the 
Court to reconsider the Second Circuit’s ruling that defalcation requires a 
conscious or extremely reckless state of mind, and thus Hyman, a 
fiduciary in default, had not committed defalcation15 and therefore would 
not be liable for debts he had mishandled.16 With their holding in the 
underlying case, the Second Circuit aligned itself with the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits by requiring extreme recklessness on the part of the 
defalcator before debts would be excepted from discharge.17  
                                                                                                                         
Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); Office of Thrift Supervision v. Felt (In re 
Felt), 255 F.3d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 
1186-87 (9th Cir. 1996); Meyer v. Rigdon (In re Rigdon), 36 F.3d 1375, 1384-85 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
11 See In re Patel, 565 F.3d at 970-71; In re Hyman, 502 F.3d at 68-69; In re Felt, 
255 F.3d at 226; In re Rigdon, 36 F.3d at 1384-85. 
12 See In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811; Tudor Oaks Ltd. P’ship v. Cochrane (In re 
Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1186-87.  
13 Knox, supra note 5, at 1108. 
14 In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 895 (2009).  
15 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 479.  
16 See In re Hyman, 502 F.3d at 68-69.  
17 See Current Circuit Splits, 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 129, 143 (2007). This journal 
provides an overview of circuit splits rather than analyses. Id. at 129. The Article notes 
the breakdown of the circuits regarding the level of intent necessary for defalcation. Id. at 
143. It points out that the Second Circuit chose to adopt the most stringent standard for 
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By denying cert to the petitioner in Denton,18 the Supreme Court 
effectively chose not to resolve a persistent split among the circuit courts 
regarding the state of mind required for defalcation. Defalcation is one of 
the several exceptions to the discharge of debts available to an individual 
debtor upon declaring bankruptcy,19 and as a result of the Supreme Court’s 
denial of certiorari, the exception will continue to vary between the 
circuits. To this point, the circuits have been “laboratories for 
experimentation”20 regarding the mental state required for defalcation, and 
although this would be acceptable and even beneficial in certain contexts 
from a federalist perspective,21 the nature of business in the twenty-first 
century renders unjust the circuit split regarding defalcation. Individuals, 
as well as corporations, conduct business across jurisdictions and, by 
extension, across various circuits. Based on broad theories of personal 
jurisdiction that can place an individual in federal court22 and the 
application of state law in certain federal court cases,23 this results in an 
individual’s liability for debts to vary across circuits. Fiduciaries, as well 
as those who entrust funds to them, have a reasonable expectation of being 
                                                                                                                         
intent necessary to commit defalcation and that it is in a minority of the circuits in doing 
so. Id. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits require some level of fault above 
negligence. Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
18 In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 895 (2009).  
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006).  
20 United States v. Lopez (In re Lopez), 514 U.S. 548, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to 
devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”).  
21 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (In re Liebmann), 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the experimentation of the various states allows 
for the meeting of changing needs, which can then ultimately be adopted by the majority 
for the improvement of society). 
22 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (finding 
an individual can be subject to personal jurisdiction in a given state if that individual 
either has minimum contacts in the state or if he has availed himself of the state, even if 
only by putting a product in the stream of commerce that is likely to end in the state); see 
also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 297-98 (1980) 
(requiring purposeful availment of the benefits of a forum state for personal jurisdiction 
to be exercised, while rejecting the idea that isolated contacts arising from unilateral 
actions of consumers within the forum state can establish personal jurisdiction).  
23 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that except in 
cases where the Constitution or Congress has pre-empted state law, the law applied in a 
case is the law of the state); see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1979) 
(federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction or bankruptcy jurisdiction must apply state 
common substantive law); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) 
(requiring in a case of mixed state and federal jurisdiction that the federal claim giving 
rise to federal jurisdiction share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the state 
claims in an action for the federal court to hear the state claim).  
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put on notice about their liability for debts after bankruptcy. Because 
business may be conducted across various circuits, the time has come for a 
uniform standard of liability.  
 
II. ORIGINAL INTENT: THE MEANING OF THE WORD DEFALCATION AND 
HAND’S INTERPRETATION IN CENTRAL HANOVER BANK  
AND TRUST CO. V. HERBST 
 
Confusion surrounding the concept of defalcation has plagued courts 
in recent years on a very practical level, but the confusion stems at least 
partly from linguistic development. A literal translation of defalcation 
from its Latin roots yields the phrases “‘a chopping off’ or ‘cutting 
down.’”24 Those phrases have little to do with modern understandings of 
the term, which largely include “‘a taking away’ or ‘failure to meet an 
obligation [or] non-fraudulent default.’”25 Black’s Law Dictionary also 
provides the archaic alternate definition, “[a] deduction; a set-off.”26 
Finding common ground among these various definitions proves difficult. 
They boil down to an action of taking away, although there is considerable 
variation between chopping off and failing to meet an obligation. In the 
bankruptcy context, this amounts to an action of wrongfully depriving 
another of funds, but nowhere does the meaning of the word articulate any 
practical standard for an analysis of the requisite intent. Understanding the 
meaning of defalcation could shed light on the intent required for 
defalcation.  
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Herbst is the seminal case 
circuits look to in order to determine the meaning of defalcation.27 In 
Central Hanover Bank, the debtor in question received an award for funds 
in a real property suit.28 This debtor spent his award without waiting to 
learn whether the opposing creditor would appeal the decision, and 
because he spent his money prematurely, the debtor did not have funds 
remaining when the high court ultimately reversed the decision.29 Shortly 
thereafter, the debtor declared bankruptcy.30 The bankruptcy court was 
faced with whether the debt incurred through the prior suit should be 
                                                 
24 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 57-85-86, § 57:29 (Honorable William 
L. Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton III eds., West) (3d ed. 2010).  
25 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004)).  
26 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 479. 
27 See Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1937). 
28 Id. at 511.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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discharged under section 17(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Act.31 In its 
determination, the court analyzed the word defalcation as it appeared in 
nineteenth century bankruptcy legislation and unsurprisingly was unable 
to definitively interpret the plain meaning of the word.32 The court 
concluded that regardless of the “original meaning of ‘defalcation,’ it must 
... have covered other defaults than deliberate malversations, else it add[s] 
nothing to the words, ‘fraud or embezzlement.’”33 The court went on to 
distinguish defalcation from misappropriation, which would require more 
than mere negligence or mistake.34 The court determined that defalcation 
required “some portion of misconduct” but not more than “mere 
negligence or mistake,” as would be required by misappropriation.35  
Since 1937, courts and circuits have interpreted the phrase “some 
portion of misconduct”36 in a variety of ways. As subsequent discussions 
will show, Justice Hand’s statement in Central Hanover Bank has turned 
into a quagmire within bankruptcy law. Throughout the twentieth century, 
courts have chosen to latch on to the ambiguous language in the opinion, 
rather than recognize that the Central Hanover Bank court deliberately 
distinguished defalcation from wrongdoing that would require a higher 
mental state than mere negligence or mistake.37 The Second Circuit is the 
circuit most recently guilty of this in its In re Hyman decision.38 
Unfortunately, modern circuits have hijacked Judge Hand’s use of the 
phrase “some portion of misconduct”39 and taken it to support a 
recklessness standard, thus requiring conscious conduct.40 Read in a 
                                                 
31 Id. (The relevant questions are whether the debtor incurred his debt through 
“‘fraud, embezzlement misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in 
any fiduciary capacity’; and whether, having been discharged, he was acting ‘in any 
fiduciary capacity,’ when he took the money.”).  
32 Id. (finding that regardless of what the original meaning of “defalcation” was, it 
included something beyond deliberate malfeasance). 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 512.  
35 Id. at 510. 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 See Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2007) (focusing 
on the language in Central Hanover Bank that some misconduct might be required to 
establish defalcation). 
39 See, e.g., Moreno v. Ashworth (In re Moreno), 892 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(arguing that a “defalcation is a willful neglect of duty,” regardless of fraud or 
embezzlement).  
40 Recklessness is the lowest mental state that requires conscious conduct, with the 
implication of an element of willfulness. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 
1385 (defining “reckless” as being “[c]haracterized by the creation of a substantial and 
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vacuum, the phrase might support a recklessness standard, but read in 
context with the surrounding language, it is clear that Justice Hand 
intended that innocent mistakes suffice to constitute defalcation.41  
 
III. HEIGHTENED MENTAL STATE IS NECESSARY: THE FIRST, FIFTH, SIXTH, 
AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS 
 
Several circuits have attempted to resolve the circuit split by requiring 
the defalcator to have more than a negligent state of mind.42 These circuits 
have required anything in the range of willful neglect, recklessness, and 
even actual knowledge.  
The First Circuit has gone beyond adopting a blanket standard and 
articulated factors to consider in determining whether a debtor should be 
required to except certain debts from discharge. The First Circuit noted the 
exception to discharge applies to fiduciaries only when they are acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, that defalcation requires a breach of a fiduciary duty, 
and that defalcation must mean something other than fraud and is different 
from “willful and malicious injury.”43 Although this Baylis test may prove 
helpful as far as giving notice, the factors do nothing to clear up the debate 
about the intent required for defalcation. Instead, they bring attention to 
the fact that defalcation requires a breach of fiduciary duty.44 The First 
Circuit’s emphasis on the breach element of a negligence cause of action 
evades the issue in need of clarification—the intent required for 
defalcation. Although the circuit settles on a heightened recklessness 
standard as to intent, falling somewhere short of specific intent,45 the 
                                                                                                                         
unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) 
disregard for or indifference to that risk; heedless; rash. Reckless conduct is much more 
than mere negligence: it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do.”). 
41 Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(finding that the use of defalcation in the Act of 1841 probably included innocent 
defaults). 
42 See Meyer v. Rigdon (In re Rigdon), 36 F.3d 1375, 1384-85 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting the view that negligent acts may constitute defalcation); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. 
v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 1982) (adopting an objective 
knowledge test and finding actual knowledge of the law or subjective intent to violate a 
fiduciary duty or bad faith irrelevant to the question of whether a defalcation has 
occurred). 
43 Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 313 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2002).  
44 Id. at 20 (“Defalcation may be presumed from breach of the duty of loyalty, the 
duty not to act in the fiduciary’s own interest when that interest comes or may come into 
conflict with the beneficiaries’ interest ….”). 
45 In re Baylis, 313 F.3d at 20 (“To show defalcation, a creditor need not prove that a 
debtor acted knowingly or willfully, in the sense of specific intent. However, a creditor 
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court’s application of the standard focuses on the breach of a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, rather than any actual intent.46  
 The Seventh Circuit has stated that negligence is not enough for 
defalcation,47 and the Sixth Circuit agrees that negligence is not enough,48 
but the court goes further and essentially finds that intent is irrelevant for 
determining whether an individual is liable for defalcation, resulting in the 
Sixth Circuit imposing the highest standard.49 The court states that 
“creating a debt by breaching a fiduciary duty is a sufficiently bad act to 
invoke the … [defalcation] exception even without a subjective mental 
state evidencing intent to breach a known fiduciary duty or bad faith in 
doing so.”50 To determine if defalcation exists, the court employs an 
objective knowledge standard.51 This principle at least provides a bright 
line standard, but it is inconsistent with other United States jurisprudence, 
and thus provides no clarity as to a uniform standard to be used across 
jurisdictions.52  
The Fifth Circuit presents a tempting standard, one of willful neglect 
or recklessness. This circuit has stated that “[t]he defalcation 
determination turns on … whether … [a debtor’s] breaches were 
‘willful,’” and that “willfulness is measured objectively by reference to 
what a reasonable person in the debtor’s position knew or reasonably 
                                                                                                                         
must be able to show that a debtor’s actions were so egregious that they come close to the 
level that would be required to prove fraud, embezzlement, or larceny.”). 
46 In re Baylis, 313 F.3d at 22 (“Given this combination of the fiduciary breach 
which caused the lawsuit and the self-dealing to defend against it, we find that Baylis’s 
actions here constitute defalcation under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).”). Although the Baylis 
factors are somewhat redundant when coupled with the language from Central Hanover 
Bank, In re Baylis does appropriately draw attention to the fiduciary role. The first and 
second Baylis factors serve to emphasize that a fiduciary is a person different from the 
typical everyday debtor and should be held to a different standard than the run of the mill 
unlucky debtor. Id. “The ‘badness’ related to defalcation by a fiduciary is supplied ‘by an 
individual’s special legal status with respect to another, with its attendant duties and high 
standards of dealing, and the act of breaching those duties.’” Id. The First Circuit argues 
that it is this breach of such a significant duty, that of a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, that 
makes defalcation an appropriate reason to except discharge for a person assuming that 
role. Id. 
47 See Meyer v. Rigdon (In re Rigdon), 36 F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) (“we 
cannot say that Congress intended for a debt arising from a mere negligent breach of 
fiduciary duty to be excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(11)”). 
48 See In re Johnson, 691 F.2d at 249, 257 (6th Cir. 1982).  
49 See id. (adopting an objective knowledge standard). 
50 Id. at 256.  
51 Id. at 255. 
52 See discussion supra Part II; discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
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should have known.”53 Although the willful neglect standard is attractive, 
because it seems to retain the negligence standard while requiring a higher 
level of awareness, it can be less than workable. Neglect,54 and by 
extension negligent behavior, is distinct from recklessness,55 therefore, the 
willful neglect standard the Fifth Circuit has articulated56 is essentially 
contradictory and meaningless.  
The willful neglect standard begets confusion. Commentators who 
argue for the willful neglect standard desire a standard higher than 
negligence but lower than recklessness.57 In theory, this standard would 
satisfy two competing policy interests; honest but unfortunate debtors 
would get a fresh start because defalcation would require behavior worse 
than negligence58 and at the same time, fiduciaries would be held 
accountable for their behavior even without it rising to the level of 
reckless or conscious action.59 But what is willful neglect? It is willful, or 
intentional, which takes the conscious disregard element from the 
recklessness standard. The neglect part of the phrase obviously refers to 
the negligence standard. Put together, it is as meaningless a phrase as 
Central Hanover Bank’s “some portion of misconduct.”60  
                                                 
53 Office of Thrift Supervision v. Felt (In re Felt), 255 F.3d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 2001). 
54 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1132 (defining “neglect” as “[t]he 
omission of proper attention to a person or thing, whether inadvertent, negligent, or 
willful; the act or condition of disregarding … failure to give proper attention, 
supervision, or necessities, … to such an extent that harm results or is likely to result”).  
55 Id. at 1385 (Defining “recklessness” as “[c]onduct whereby the actor does not 
desire harmful consequence but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes 
the risk. Recklessness involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser 
degree of fault than intentional wrongdoing.”).  
56 See, e.g., In re Felt, 255 F.3d at 226 (requiring a willful mental state).  
57 See Meyer v. Rigdon (In re Rigdon), 36 F.3d 1375, 1384-85 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that mere negligence will not suffice); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that even though negligence will not 
establish defalcation, the debtor had objective knowledge of the wrongdoing, thus 
constituting defalcation); see also Knox, supra note 5, at 1081 (arguing for the willful 
neglect/recklessness standard to be applied for an act to constitute defalcation); Johnson, 
supra note 1, at 97 (arguing that “a standard of intent similar to willful neglect should be 
used to determine whether a fiduciary has committed defalcation”). 
58 Knox, supra note 5, at 1109-10 (explaining how the honest but unfortunate debtor 
is protected because his debts are not barred from being discharged by the mere 
negligence of a fiduciary under a willful neglect standard). 
59 Johnson, supra note 1, at 128 (explaining how a fiduciary who intended to commit 
an act, but not the bad outcome to the debtor, would be held liable for defalcation). 
60 Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1937). 
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Several commentators have argued for the application of this willful 
neglect or recklessness standard.61 These commentators focus on 
balancing policy issues: weighing the need to hold a fiduciary accountable 
with the countervailing interest of providing the honest but unfortunate 
debtor with a fresh start.62 Although it is noble to offer sympathy to the 
unfortunate debtor, given the recent financial turmoil in the United 
States,63 attributable in part to lack of fiduciary accountability,64 it makes 
more sense to focus on the irresponsible debtor.65 The irresponsible debtor 
should not be given a clean slate. “The narrow reading of the word 
‘fiduciary’ and the broad reach of defalcation in section 523(a)(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Code cannot easily be reconciled with the concept of a fresh 
start for the ‘honest but unfortunate’ debtor.”66 Although a potentially 
harsh result, this debtor seems far from honest and should be held to the 
standard of the fiduciary that he has held himself out to be.  
The Knox and Johnson Notes previously referenced pose an identical 
hypothetical.67 An attorney is the trustee for a client’s trust.68 “The trustee 
deposits the funds in a bank, which appears on all accounts to be federally 
insured, but later goes bankrupt ….”69 Although the bank represented 
                                                 
61 Knox, supra note 5, at 1081; Johnson, supra note 1, at 97.  
62 Knox, supra note 5, at 1079-80; see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 
(1991) (recognizing that there are and must be limitations to a completely fresh start for 
an honest but unfortunate debtor).  
63 See Knox, supra note 5, at 1079 (arguing that in light of recent economic 
downturn and financial scandals, regulations that protect beneficiaries provide an 
important remedy). 
64 Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S.1074, 111th Cong. § 2(1) (2009) (stating 
that “among the central causes of the financial and economic crisis that the United States 
faces today has been a widespread failure of corporate governance”). 
65 See Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 
1982) (“Although the ‘badness’ of fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation is readily 
apparent, creating a debt by breaching a fiduciary duty is a sufficiently bad act to invoke 
the section 17(a)(4) exception even without a subjective mental state evidencing intent to 
breach a known fiduciary duty or bad faith in doing so. This is because the requisite 
‘badness,’ to conform with the spirit of the bankruptcy laws, is supplied by an 
individual's special legal status with respect to another, with its attendant duties and high 
standards of dealing, and the act of breaching these duties.”); see also Knox, supra note 
5, at 1090 (“§ 523(a)(4) may be intended to hold fiduciaries accountable for their 
actions”); Johnson, supra note 1, at 95 (“Those courts that favor a standard requiring a 
lower level of intent … agree that the need to hold fiduciaries accountable in their special 
legal roles outweighs the desire for a fresh start policy.”) 
66 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 57-87, § 57:29.  
67 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94-95.  
68 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94.  
69 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94. 
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itself as federally insured, in reality it had no such insurance.70 The trust 
wins in an action against the attorney trustee and71 the attorney trustee 
files for bankruptcy.72 The Knox and Johnson Notes pose the question, 
“[s]hould the trustee be denied discharge for committing defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity?”73 Both Notes conclude that the fiduciary 
should not be denied discharge because otherwise he would be less likely 
to serve as a fiduciary in the future and, in addition, imposing liability on 
this fiduciary will deter others from taking on fiduciary positions.74  
The bankruptcy system cannot coddle fiduciaries in such a manner. 
The fiduciary in the hypothetical obtained clients’ trust based on his 
representations that he was an expert. He should be responsible for 
investigating the persons and agencies with whom he chooses to work. 
Again, the policy consideration of encouraging fiduciary responsibility 
must outweigh the bankruptcy courts’ desire to give the honest but 
unfortunate debtor a fresh start.75  
Even worse, the willful neglect standard would work against the policy 
consideration of putting creditors, debtors, and fiduciaries on notice. 
Because the willful neglect standard comes close to make believe,76 courts 
will only be able to apply it on an inconsistent basis; the court will look at 
behavior that supposedly falls somewhere between negligence and 
recklessness and slap the label of willful neglect on it.77 But behavior 
cannot be willful and negligent at the same time.78 Just so, courts cannot 
ease their burden of resolving the issue of the appropriate standard for 
defalcation by applying a hybrid of both a negligence and willful standard.  
 
                                                 
70 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94. 
71 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94. 
72 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94.  
73 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 94. 
74 Knox, supra note 5, at 1090; Johnson, supra note 1, at 128.  
75 Knox, supra note 5, at 1080 (holding debtors accountable for defalcation can have 
a “profound impact on the efforts of an individual debtor to organize his financial affairs 
and emerge from bankruptcy with clean slate”). 
76 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
77 See, e.g., Office of Thrift Supervision v. Felt (In re Felt), 255 F.3d 220, 226-27 
(5th Cir. 2001) (finding that behavior constituted willful neglect); Meyer v. Rigdon (In re 
Meyer), 36 F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that defendant knowingly breached 
his fiduciary duty, which was “more culpable than a mere negligent breach of duty”). 
78 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1133 (defining “negligence” as “[t]he 
failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have 
exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard 
established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is 
intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others' rights”) (emphasis added).  
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IV. HYMAN: THE SECOND CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN 
 
In re Hyman, a Second Circuit case, gave the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to choose to allow the circuit split to remain unresolved.79 
With its decision in In re Hyman,80 the Second Circuit aligned itself with 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh circuits and chose to put the interests of the 
fiduciaries above the interests of their beneficiaries.81 The court ultimately 
decided that defalcation “requires a showing of conscious misbehavior or 
extreme recklessness.”82 The court first and foremost articulated 
bankruptcy law’s general interest in affording the “‘honest but 
unfortunate’ debtor a fresh start.”83 Having articulated this interest, the 
court did not choose to address whether a fiduciary deserves the same 
consideration as the typical debtor.84 As previously discussed, fiduciaries 
should arguably be held to a higher standard than the typical unfortunate 
debtor because the nature of the fiduciary position requires that the 
fiduciary hold himself or herself out as an authority, worthy of trust and 
capable of responsible behavior.85  
The Hyman court offered three justifications for their decision: first, to 
ensure “that the term ‘defalcation’ complements but does not dilute the 
other terms of the [bankruptcy code] provision … all of which require a 
showing of actual wrongful intent,” second, to “[ensure] that the harsh 
sanction of nondischargeability is reserved for those who exhibit ‘some 
portion of misconduct,’” and finally, to ensure that the standard “has the 
                                                 
79 Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
129 S.Ct. 895 (2009). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. See In re Felt, 255 F.3d at 226 (finding that defalcation is dependent on 
willfulness and thus a finding of negligence will not suffice to constitute defalcation); In 
re Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1385 (finding “a well recognized principle in bankruptcy law” is to 
provide the debtor with a fresh start); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 
691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that negligence does not constitute 
defalcation). 
82 In re Hyman, 502 F.3d at 68. 
83 Id. at 66 (citations omitted).  
84 See generally id. at 66-70. 
85 See supra note 46 and accompanying text; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
3, at 702 (defining “fiduciary” as “[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of 
another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to 
another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor … [o]ne who must exercise 
a high standard of care in managing another's money or property”); Johnson, supra note 
1, at 104 (defining fiduciary capacity as one involving one person entrusting his property 
to another in the form of an express special or technical trust). 
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virtue of ease of application since [sic] the courts and litigants have 
reference to a robust body of securities law ….”86   
As to the first concern, a negligence standard would also be distinct 
from, but in line with, the other terms of section 523(a)(4).87 Although 
negligent behavior is wrongful to a lesser degree than the other evils 
enumerated in section 523(a)(4), its wrongfulness is exacerbated when 
committed by a fiduciary.88 Thus, a negligence standard could comport 
with the Second Circuit’s first goal in the same way that a recklessness 
standard would. As for the second reason, negligent acts by a fiduciary do 
involve some portion of misconduct, as numerous circuits have 
recognized.89  
The only legitimate consideration enumerated by the Hyman court is 
the ease of application concern. Although consistency and uniformity are 
legitimate goals, the Hyman court’s ease of application only applies within 
the Second Circuit, and the need for consistency and uniformity applies 
throughout the United States.90 Additionally, consistently applying an ill-
formed standard is arguably worse than inconsistently applying the more 
appropriate standard at least part of the time.  
The Hyman court also misinterpreted Judge Hand’s opinion from 
Central Hanover Bank, in which he wrote, “[a]lthough [misapprorpiation] 
probably carries a larger implication of misconduct than ‘defalcation,’ 
‘defalcation’ may demand some portion of misconduct; we will assume 
arguendo that it does.”91 The Hyman court wrongly aligned the standard 
that Justice Hand articulated for misappropriation with the standard for 
defalcation.92 Justice Hand explicitly stated that misappropriation requires 
                                                 
86 In re Hyman, 502 F.3d at 68-69.  
87 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Although the ‘badness’ of fraud, 
embezzlement or misappropriation is readily apparent, creating a debt by breaching a 
fiduciary duty is a sufficiently bad act to invoke the section 17(a)(4) exception even 
without a subjective mental state evidencing intent to breach a known fiduciary duty or 
bad faith in doing so.”). 
88 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 57-87, § 57:29. 
(citing In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
89 See Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(stating that a fiduciary’s wrongdoing may include “innocent defaults”); Tudor Oaks Ltd. 
P’ship v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997) (referring to 
innocent or negligent defaults as “misdeeds”). 
90 See In re Hyman, 502 F.3d at 69.  
91 Id. at 67 (citing Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511-12).  
92 Id. at 67-70 (requiring conscious misbehavior or extreme recklessness for 
defalcation and applying that to actions described as misappropriation despite having just 
cited Justice Hand’s distinction between misappropriation and defalcation in which he 
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more misconduct than defalcation.93 He stated that defalcation only 
requires “some portion of misconduct.”94 An honest reading of the text 
cannot take that paragraph to support a recklessness standard. Justice 
Hand meant only that the defalcator must have done something wrong—
elsewhere in his same opinion, he stated that such wrongdoing could 
include innocent mistake.95 
 
V. A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD: THE PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
 
The decisions of three circuits, the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits, 
have differed from the holdings of the previously discussed circuits. The 
Fourth Circuit has focused on the agent-principal relationship and held 
that mistake, even innocent mistake, constitutes defalcation and is 
therefore not dischargeable.96 The Tenth Circuit has similarly held that the 
talismanic phrase “some portion of misconduct” can mean anything from 
negligence on up to reckless, willful, or intentional misbehavior.97 The 
Eighth Circuit has articulated a two-step approach: first, the court must 
determine whether the debtor occupied a fiduciary capacity; and second, 
whether the act of defalcation occurred while the debtor was acting in the 
fiduciary capacity.98  
The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits have properly focused their 
attention on the most important part of defalcation, the fiduciary 
relationship.99 They recognize that he who holds himself out as a fiduciary 
and expert should bear the risk of loss if he acts negligently. Alternatively, 
if the fiduciary is wholly innocent, he should not bear such risk.100 For that 
                                                                                                                         
stated that misappropriation involved more misconduct than defalcation). 
93 Id. at 67.  
94 Id.  
95See Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511 (“Colloquially perhaps the word, 
‘defalcation,’ ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in this context it may have 
included innocent defaults.”).  
96 Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 
2001).  
97 Antlers Roof-Truss & Builders Supply v. Storie (In re Storie), 216 B.R. 283, 288 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997).  
98 Tudor Oaks Ltd. P’ship v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 
1997) (citing Lewis v. Scott, 97 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
99 See In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811; In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984; Oklahoma 
Grocers Ass’n, Inc. v. Millikan (In re Millikan), 188 Fed. App’x. 699, 702 (10th Cir. 
2006).  
100 See In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811 (requiring mistake for defalcation, although 
that mistake may be innocent); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984 (requiring default for 
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reason, the proper resolution of the circuit split is a negligence standard. 
More specifically, courts should employ the Eighth Circuit’s two-part test 
which consists of  looking to see if a fiduciary relationship existed, and 
then determining whether the mistake occurred while acting in this 
fiduciary capacity.101 The courts should continue to focus on the fiduciary 
relationship, as that relationship is ultimately the defining characteristic of 
defalcation. 
Of course, the two-part test is somewhat redundant. It merely echoes 
the inherent truth that in order for an individual to be held liable for 
defalcation, that individual must be a fiduciary; this is true because section 
523(a)(4) requires fiduciary status for defalcation.102 However, the Eighth 
Circuit two part test is useful in that it draws attention away from the 
picture of the supposedly pitiful honest but unfortunate debtor and back to 
the reality of the misbehaving fiduciary.103  
The Ninth Circuit in In re Lewis has also explicitly held that the intent 
to defraud is not required to make the individual liable for defalcation.104 
In Woodworking Enterprises, Inc. v. Baird (In re Baird), the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “[i]n the context of section 523(a)(4), the term ‘defalcation’ 
includes innocent, as well as intentional or negligent defaults so as to 
reach the conduct of all fiduciaries who were short in their accounts.”105 In 
In re Baird, the Ninth Circuit recognized the often overlooked policy 
interest of holding fiduciaries accountable for all of their conduct.106 
Yet the Ninth Circuit recognized conflicting precedent within its own 
jurisdiction in the case of Martin v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland 
(In re Martin).107 That case calls for an ambiguous element of “bad faith 
                                                                                                                         
defalcation, although intent is unnecessary). 
101 See In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984.  
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006).  
103 See In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984 (describing defalcation as a misappropriation 
or failure by fiduciary). 
104 Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996). Business partner 
of debtors incurred debt arising from investment in partnership’s craft stores.  Id. 
Bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for partner, finding the debt 
nondischargeable.  Id. Bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. Id. Court of appeals held that 
debtors owed trustees of partner a fiduciary duty within the meaning of defalcation under 
Arizona law and that that duty had been breached by commingling partner’s investment 
with other funds and not producing complete account for handling of funds. Id. 
105 Woodworking Enter., Inc. v. Baird (In re Baird),114 B.R. 198, 204 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1990).  
106 Id.  
107 Martin v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (In re Martin), 161 B.R. 672, 678 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993).  
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or reprehensible conduct” for a finding of defalcation.108 Unfortunately, 
that standard is as unworkable as Central Hanover Bank’s “some portion 
of misconduct.”109 In re Martin searches wistfully for some workable 
standard between neglect and willful neglect or recklessness.110 Between 
the lines, the opinion reads that the court will know defalcation when it 
sees it.111 But a court’s ad hoc recognition of bad conduct cannot serve to 
put fiduciaries on notice about their potential liability for defalcation. For 
that reason, the Ninth Circuit overruled In re Martin, ridding itself of such 
ambiguous and unworkable language.112 
With the aforementioned analysis, the Ninth Circuit has correctly 
recognized that the policy consideration of fiduciary accountability 
overrides the policy of giving the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh 
start.113 Ultimately, an unfortunate debtor and a negligent debtor-fiduciary 
are not the same, and a fiduciary must be held to a higher standard than the 
lay debtor.114 Attempts to equate them will only allow, and even 
encourage, less than diligent behavior on the part of debtor-fiduciaries.115 
In fact, although debated within scholarship, even the familiar deference 
of the business judgment rule comports with the application of a 
negligence standard in a debtor fiduciary context.  
 
VI. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS APPLIED TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Commentators have argued that the willful neglect or recklessness 
standard is the appropriate one for defalcation because it is the equivalent 
of the business judgment rule,116 but this logic misapplies the business 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1937).  
110 See In re Martin, 161 B.R. at 677-78 (discussing varying standards of culpability 
required for defalcation). 
111 Id. at 678. 
112 Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1996).  
113 See id. at 1185-86 (stating that although the purpose of bankruptcy is to discharge 
all debts, the exception of defalcation does not require purposeful wrongdoing).  
114 See id. at 1186 (stating that a fiduciary relationship imposes the highest duty of 
good faith). 
115 Antlers Roof-Truss & Builders Supply v. Storie (In re Storie), 216 B.R. 283, 287 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (stating that holding fiduciaries to an objective standard 
encourages them to act carefully).  
116 See Knox supra note 5, at 1081; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
3, at 226 (defining the “business-judgment rule” as “[t]he presumption that in making 
business decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act 
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief their actions are in the 
corporation’s best interest”). “The rule shields directors and officers from liability for 
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judgment rule. The business judgment rule exists to protect those working 
in a fiduciary capacity who make reasoned decisions that later prove 
incorrect.117 The business judgment rule is not meant to protect those 
fiduciaries that act negligently when managing funds on behalf of their 
beneficiaries.118  
Some make the argument that the business judgment rule exists to 
protect corporate fiduciaries from the equivalent of honest mistake,119 but 
honest mistake and neglect do not mean the same thing. Honest mistake 
results from reasoned judgment that later proves to be false.120 Neglect 
results from a breach of a duty, and a person can “‘neglect’ his duty either 
intentionally or negligently”121 Therefore, if section 523(a)(4) were to be 
construed to shield fiduciaries from liability in the same way that the 
business judgment rule does, it should only protect him from honest 
mistakes rather than a negligent breach of duty.122  
Proponents of the recklessness standard also latch on to the business 
judgment rule as a way of promulgating “a familiar and understandable 
norm of conduct for those acting in a fiduciary capacity” when those 
people find themselves faced with bankruptcy.123 Though fiduciaries will 
typically be familiar with the business judgment rule, they will similarly 
be familiar with standards of negligence.124 That is not to say that 
bankruptcy courts should take away all deference from fiduciaries. If a 
fiduciary makes a business decision that later proves harmful, he or she 
should be shielded from liability under the business judgment rule, as 
                                                                                                                         
unprofitable or harmful corporate transactions if the transactions were made in good 
faith, with due care, and within the directors’ or officers’ authority.” Id. at 226-27. 
117 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 227 (shielding from “unprofitable” 
decisions if they “were made in good faith …”). 
118 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (“[t]hus, a director's 
duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care”). 
119 Knox, supra note 5, at 1108.  
120 See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964) (holding that “the directors 
will not be penalized for an honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment appeared 
reasonable at the time the decision was made”).  
121 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1132-33 (citation omitted). 
122 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (De1. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a duty 
to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then act with 
requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”). 
123 Knox, supra note 5, at 1108. 
124 Antlers Roof-Truss & Builders Supply v. Storie (In re Storie), 216 B.R. 283, 287 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (stating that fiduciaries are charged with knowledge of the 
applicable law). 
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norms of business practice in the United States demand.125 But if the 
fiduciary acts negligently while making decisions, the shield should come 
down, and those debts should not be dischargeable.126  
This standard would not deviate from norms in any harmful way. The 
business judgment rule grants deference to corporate fiduciaries “‘unless a 
challenger produces evidence establishing that the directors acted 
fraudulently, in bad faith, or with gross or culpable negligence…; [o]ther 
terms that have been used to describe the type of conduct not protected… 
include…willful abuse of discretionary power or neglect of duty, and 
recklessness.’”127 The commentator in question cited that statement to 
support a recklessness standard, but the language actually cuts the other 
way. Although recklessness does not enjoy business judgment rule 
protection, neither does “neglect of duty,” and neither should neglect of 
duty protect a bankrupt fiduciary.128 Therefore, imposing a negligence 
standard for defalcation would not deviate from any norms, as it would not 
violate fiduciaries’ expectations under established principles of corporate 
law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
After examining the original intent and policy considerations 
surrounding the debate over the proper mental standard for defalcation 
under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, it becomes clear that the 
only correct standard mus71t be negligence. Courts have hesitated to 
adopt this standard across the board129 and continue to search for that 
nonexistent level of culpability that fits their individual interpretations of 
the talismanic phrase “some portion of misconduct.”130 But such searching 
is not necessary. Central Hanover Bank made it clear from the outset of 
defalcation jurisprudence that innocent mistake on the part of fiduciary 
suffices to except discharge.131  
Subsequent case law does offer negligent fiduciaries hope that they 
can still wipe their slate clean so long as their actions do not rise to a 
                                                 
125 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that the business judgment rule provides an 
assumption of the good faith of directors, absent an abuse of discretion). 
126 See id. at 812 (noting that the business judgment rule is based on gross negligence 
concepts). 
127 Knox, supra note 5, at 1109 (citations omitted).  
128 Id.  
129 See supra Parts III and IV. 
130 See supra Part IV. 
131 See supra Part II. 
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reckless level,132 but the Supreme Court must take on the task of 
overruling that erroneous body of case law. In the choice between 
negligence and recklessness, original intent of courts and the nature of the 
fiduciary position both support negligence. In addition, the financial crises 
of the past decade should make it clear to courts that extending near-
absolute forgiveness to negligent fiduciaries is not a valid policy 
concern.133 Under the recklessness standard, only intentional acts, such as 
fraud, would hold fiduciaries accountable.134 The nature of the fiduciary 
role demands more accountability. Such accountability can be found in 
applying a negligence standard to defalcation.  
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132 See supra Part III. 
133 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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